





































This paper provides an analysis on the source of dollarization in Turkey 
by constructing measures for asset, liability and offshore dollarization. 
In doing so, the study seeks a co-integration relationship among these 
variables. Results suggest that rising asset dollarization was mainly 
demand-driven originating from increasing demand for foreign assets 
before the 2001 financial crisis. The increasing demand for foreign 
assets in turn resulted in an increase in foreign currency-denominated 
debt thus causing an increase in liability dollarization. However, this 
story changed radically after the crisis. The post-crisis period witnessed 
externally driven dollarization albeit at a decreasing rate. Increasing 
external funding opportunities for the banking system produced an 
increase in offshore dollarization, which eventually fed into higher asset 
dollarization than otherwise would have occurred. Thus, the empirical 
evidence suggests that if it were not for the increasing rate of offshore 
dollarization, asset dollarization would have been lower. The evidence 
also suggests that the strong fight against inflation under the Inflation 
Targeting framework led to lower asset dollarization through lower 
inflation and a more stable exchange rate; however the resulting interest 
rate differentials and decreased currency risk also motivated more 
external funding thus leading to higher offshore dollarization. 
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Emerging market economies (EMs) have been increasingly resorting to 
international markets to finance domestic production due to insufficient 
domestic capital. In the meantime, global liquidity has become abundant 
over the past years, mainly owing to extremely accommodative 
monetary policies in the US, Eurozone and Japan during 2002 and 2005. 
More specifically, the recent past can be characterized as one where 
excess global liquidity conditions and historical low levels of risk 
aversion remained in abundance. This has provided easy money to 
financial markets in the form of increase in foreign currency 
denominated liability. 
In the meantime, EMs are still exposed to problems arising from deposit 
dollarization that tends to be high and persistent. Banking system when 
faced with large domestic and external liabilities denominated in foreign 
currencies may either absorb the currency risk by making domestic 
currency loans or shift the currency risk to the borrowers by lending in 
foreign currencies. Empirical findings suggest that banks once exposed 
to currency risk through dollar liabilities from domestic and external 
sources shift this risk onto firms by lending in foreign currency (Luca 
and Petrova, 2008). 
In a dollarized economy, dollarization traditionally implied doubts about 
the stability of money, thus causing the monetary policy to be less 
effective and more complex (Reinhart et al, 2003). In other words, 
dollarization was an obstacle that challenged the pursuit of a coherent 
and independent monetary policy. 
1
 
The recent crisis situations in Russia, East Asia, Argentina and Turkey 
have shown that foreign currency-denominated deposits are mirrored by 
liabilities. Both seem to be important in determining the characteristics 
and the degree of dollarization. Hence, “liability dollarization” came to 
be noticed after increased attention to the vulnerability of EMs.  
                                                 
1
 Seminal works on currency substitution that discuss the effects of dollarization on 
monetary policy effectiveness include Miles (1978), Bordo and Choudri (1982), Girton 
and Roper (1981), Ortiz (1983), Canzoneri and Diba (1992), Thomas (1985), Artis 
(1996), Giovannini (1991), Giovannini and Turtelboom (1994), Guidotti (1993), 
Krueger and Ha (1995), McKinnon (1982, 1985), Calvo and Végh (1992, 1996). 
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While asset dollarization is generally seen as being caused primarily by 
a history of macroeconomic mismanagement, liability dollarization can 
be attributed to several factors. These include financial sector 
development and completeness, moral hazard causing borrowers to 
increase their foreign currency liabilities and bailout expectations. 
(Caballero and Krishnamurthy, 2002; Dooley, 1997; Burnside et al, 
1999). Liability dollarization can also be analyzed in the context of a 
general portfolio model by studying such factors as capital inflows, 
regulatory wedge, risk and market power differentials (Ize and Levy-
Yeyati, 1998; Catao and Terrones, 2000). The increased globalization of 
financial markets and liberalization of domestic financial systems can 
lead to significant expansion in liability dollarization (Barajas and 
Morales, 2003). 
The consequences of asset dollarization are mostly related to the loss in 
effectiveness of monetary policy, but liability dollarization has many 
implications. It exposes the balance sheets of both public and private 
sectors to large swings in the exchange rate, thus contributing to 
financial crises (Goldstein and Turner, 1996). This increased 
vulnerability in turn causes policymakers to favor a relatively stable 
exchange rate.
2
 Thus, as liability dollarization amplifies potential 
downturns in economic activity (Caballero and Krisnamurthy, 2002), the 
cost of exchange rate volatility increases for policymakers. Therefore 
countries tend to be biased towards maintaining exchange rate stability 
until they are financially integrated, macroeconomically stable and can 
hedge their exchange rate risk exposure (Poirson, 2001). 
Although asset dollarization and liability dollarization have different 
causes and implications, the issue of liability dollarization was not 
generally been addressed separately from the issue of asset dollarization. 
This is especially true for the Turkish economy. Even though Yılmaz 
(2005) and Akıncı et al (2005) made some initial attempts to create a 
composite dollarization index by analyzing different measures of 
dollarization in Turkey and measuring liability dollarization, there is still 
a need for further research that explores the link between asset 
                                                 
2
 This argument was extended to explain why many countries do not let their exchange 
rates float (Calvo and Reinhart, 2000). 
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dollarization and liability dollarization in an econometric framework 
with the aim of finding the source of dollarization.  
Clearly, the source of dollarization provides very useful information 
about the motivation to dollarize in addition to offering insight about its 
policy implications. In other words, depending on the source of 
dollarization, both the underlying motivation and the policy implications 
of dollarization can vary. Hence, finding the source of dollarization is 
essential for policymakers especially before launching a dedollarization 
scheme.  
In seeking an econometric relation between various measures of 
dollarization, we exploit three distinct measures: asset dollarization, 
liability dollarization and offshore dollarization.
3
 More specifically, 
asset dollarization is measured as a share of foreign currency-
denominated deposits in broad money; liability dollarization is measured 
as the ratio of foreign currency-denominated credits to total credits 
supplied by domestic banks to residents. Offshore dollarization is 
measured as the ratio of cross-border foreign currency-denominated 
credits to total credits borrowed by the banking sector. 
4
In this context, a 
partially dollarized economy would be described as one where 
households and firms hold a fraction of their portfolio in foreign 
currency assets and/or borrow in foreign currency; banks would lend in 
foreign currency, and they would also borrow from abroad in foreign 
currency.  
Given this setting, the key objective of our paper is to shed light on the 
link between these competing concepts of dollarization. We ask whether 
dollarization is demand or supply driven, and we also study whether it 
starts domestically or externally. To our knowledge, these issues have 
not been previously addressed.  
                                                 
3
 Clearly, in this paper, asset dollarization ignores other foreign currency denominated 
assets such as stocks and bonds and in fact boils down to measuring deposit 
dollarization. Similarly, liability dollarization measures only loan dollarization. 
Furthermore, owing to the lack of data, asset dollarization does not include foreign 
currency cash holdings or offshore deposits by the private sector. 
4
 The share of cross-border foreign currency denominated credits to total credits 
borrowed by the banking sector is admittedly a coarse measure for offshore 
dollarization.  
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The paper is in four sections. After this brief introduction, the next 
section provides a short account of the Turkish experience with 
dollarization. The following section presents the findings of the 
econometric model. Finally, the last section deals with conclusions.  
II. The History of Dollarization in Turkey 
The Turkish economy has been experiencing dollarization since the 
introduction of foreign currency deposits in December 1983. Metin-
Ozcan and Us (2007) point out that a high and volatile rate of inflation, a 
depreciating exchange rate, unsuccessful stabilization efforts, financial 
crises, and under-developed capital markets all contributed to the rising 
dollarization ratios. The authors point out that asset dollarization has 
been heavily and adversely affected by the volatility that has resulted 
from inflation, from exchange rate changes and expectations about 
exchange rate changes.  
Figures 1-2 demonstrate that dollarization has been on a steady rise 
during 1985-1993. The below figures further show that that the 
significant devaluation of the Turkish lira in the aftermath of the 1994 
financial crisis carried dollarization to an upper plateau. The collapse of 
the exchange-rate-based stabilization program in February 2001 further 
promoted the upward trend in dollarization. However, recent figures 
indicate that the dollarization ratio has been declining since the end of 
2001-from 57 percent in October 2001 to 34 percent by mid 2006. Yet, a 
cursory look at figure 3 shows that the downward trend in asset 
dollarization stems from more than proportionate increase in M2Y, i.e. 
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Figure 1. Asset Dollarization and 
Exchange Rate (percent) 
Figure 2. Asset Dollarization and 





























































































































Annual inflation rate (right axis)
 
Source: Central Bank of Turkey Source: Central Bank of Turkey 
















































































































Asset Dollarization FX Deposits (right axis)
 
Source: Central Bank of Turkey 
 
Liability dollarization that captures the financial system’s exposure to 
systemic risk in the case of large devaluations follows a similar pattern 
with asset dollarization. In other words, liability dollarization, which is 
denoted by the share of foreign exchange credits in total credits, 
declined noticeably after the 2001 crisis from 50 percent in September 
 Journal of Economic Cooperation and Development  35 
 
2001 to 17 percent in June 2006. However, foreign currency 
denominated credits followed an upward trend throughout the last 
decade (Figure 4). 
















































































































Liability Dollarization FX Credits (right axis)
 
Source: Central Bank of Turkey 
Offshore dollarization -our final measure of dollarization- is denoted by 
the ratio of foreign credits used by the banking sector to total credits 
borrowed by the banking sector and it shows an upward trend 
throughout the analysis. Unlike the other measures, offshore 
dollarization continued its upward trend after the 2001 financial crisis. 
Moreover, starting in mid 2003, foreign credits used by the banking 
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Offshore Dollarization Foreign Credits Used by the Banking Sector (right axis)
 
Source: Central Bank of Turkey 
In summary, asset dollarization and liability dollarization decreased in the 
aftermath of the 2001 financial crisis, but the offshore dollarization ratio 
increased further. Both foreign currency-denominated deposits and foreign 
currency-denominated credits continued to increase during this period. 
Moreover, asset dollarization and liability dollarization moved in the same 
direction while offshore dollarization followed a different pattern.  
 
These findings suggest that as the Turkish economy started to stabilize after 
the crisis, both the asset dollarization and the liability dollarization ratios 
fell significantly; however the economic stabilization led to more external 
funding opportunities for banks, as indicated by higher offshore 
dollarization.  
 
This finding is compatible with the recent finding by Luca and Petrova 
(2008) that states that emerging market and transition economies have in 
general insufficient domestic capital and use international markets to 
finance domestic production. 
 
III. Empirical Analysis  
 
The results of the earlier section leave us with several unanswered 
questions. Does offshore dollarization result in more asset dollarization and 
liability dollarization than would otherwise take place? Where does 
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dollarization originate? Does dollarization originate on the asset side or on 
the liability side or is it simply fed by external funding of the banking 
sector? Finally, the evidence suggests a reversal in asset dollarization and 
liability dollarization after the financial crisis. If so, the questions need to be 
asked separately for the pre-crisis and post-crisis periods since there are 
probably different factors affecting dollarization.  
 
Barajas and Morales (2003) and Morón and Castro (2003) offer empirical 
evaluations to resolve the above questions. They study the relationship 
between asset dollarization and liability dollarization in a cointegrating 
relation and provide evidence about the direction of causality. They find 
that deposit dollarization is the source of loan dollarization; initially deposit 
dollarization causes liability dollarization but later on liability dollarization 
causes asset dollarization.  
 
We would expect to find a similar result where dollarization is demand 
driven in the pre-crisis period but supply driven in the post-crisis period. 
We also expect to find causality between liability dollarization and offshore 
dollarization during the post-crisis period.  
 
The reasoning is as follows: as more external funding became more 
available to banks in the post-crisis period, they were able to offer more 
funds denominated in foreign currency; this led to an increase in foreign 
currency-denominated deposits. However, in the pre-crisis period, we 
believe that dollarization originated on the asset side implying that when 
agents demanded more foreign currency for hedging purposes, this was 
reflected as an increase in foreign currency-denominated deposits. The 
increase in foreign currency-denominated deposits in turn resulted in an 
increase in foreign currency-denominated credits.  
 
However, in the first sub-period (pre-crisis) there was a relatively low level 
of external funding opportunities and dollarization was demand-driven. 
Thus we would not expect to find direct links between asset dollarization 
and offshore dollarization, or between liability dollarization and offshore 
dollarization. 
 
III. 1. Methodology and a search for appropriate variables  
 
In the spirit of the above studies and our view about the source of 
dollarization as discussed above, we will conduct a co-integration analysis 
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to search for a relationship between the various forms of dollarization. 
More specifically, we would like to see whether there is a long-run 
relationship between asset dollarization and liability dollarization. Thus, we 
will study the dollarized assets and liabilities of the non-banking sector as 
well as offshore dollarization in the banking sector. 
 
III.1.1. Data Considerations 
 
Our data cover the period from 1996:06 to 2006:06. The asset dollarization 
of the non-banking sector is represented by the logarithm of the ratio of 
foreign currency-denominated deposits to M2Y. The liability dollarization 
is represented by the logarithm of the ratio of foreign currency-
denominated loans to total loans. To denote offshore dollarization, we 
calculated the logarithm of the ratio of the borrowings of banks from 
abroad to banks’ total borrowings excluding central bank credit. All data 
sources are publicly available through CBRT electronic data dissemination 
system (http://tcmbf40.tcmb.gov.tr/cbt.html). 
 
III.1.2.Testing for Granger Causality 
 
To analyze the econometric link between these various measures of 
dollarization, we first conducted Granger causality tests. Given the graphic 
evidence presented earlier about the reversal in trend of asset dollarization 
and liability dollarization after the 2001 crisis, the test is also run for sub-
periods. Test results in Table 1 suggest that there is a pair-wise Granger 
causality between asset dollarization and liability dollarization throughout 
the analysis and in the first sub-period from 1996-2001. However, as 
expected, the direction of Granger causality between asset dollarization and 
liability dollarization changes in the second sub-period. In other words, 
liability dollarization Granger-causes asset dollarization but asset 
dollarization does not Granger-cause liability dollarization in the post-crisis 
period.  
 
According to the test results, there is pair-wise Granger causality between 
liability dollarization and offshore dollarization in the post-crisis period; but 
in the first sub-period, there is no Granger causality between asset 
dollarization and offshore dollarization or between liability dollarization 
and offshore dollarization.  
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1 0.304 0.002 0.054 0.938 0.062 0.670 
2 0.597 0.000 0.125 0.098 0.122 0.524 
3 0.629 0.000 0.166 0.211 0.242 0.432 
4 0.159 0.000 0.419 0.282 0.222 0.328 
5 0.060 0.000 0.465 0.139 0.250 0.112 
6 0.046 0.001 0.608 0.243 0.193 0.182 
7 0.084 0.002 0.685 0.383 0.266 0.178 
8 0.093 0.007 0.675 0.497 0.374 0.226 
9 0.045 0.017 0.755 0.620 0.388 0.313 
10 0.032 0.070 0.796 0.739 0.486 0.218 
11 0.009 0.050 0.855 0.718 0.441 0.257 















1 0.364 0.180 0.205 0.906 0.396 0.030 
2 0.656 0.019 0.344 0.275 0.504 0.228 
3 0.851 0.032 0.212 0.492 0.706 0.312 
4 0.101 0.048 0.513 0.222 0.719 0.286 
5 0.013 0.097 0.583 0.097 0.805 0.084 
6 0.023 0.062 0.551 0.187 0.546 0.152 
7 0.036 0.017 0.582 0.185 0.482 0.165 
8 0.015 0.031 0.639 0.130 0.541 0.264 
9 0.025 0.077 0.727 0.183 0.612 0.432 
10 0.045 0.075 0.779 0.183 0.732 0.582 
11 0.079 0.215 0.869 0.359 0.788 0.695 















1 0.896 0.027 0.000 0.320 0.000 0.269 
2 0.714 0.003 0.000 0.112 0.000 0.090 
3 0.303 0.018 0.000 0.254 0.000 0.243 
4 0.353 0.015 0.001 0.201 0.001 0.352 
5 0.391 0.092 0.003 0.107 0.003 0.449 
6 0.614 0.079 0.006 0.117 0.004 0.239 
7 0.558 0.220 0.012 0.179 0.011 0.308 
8 0.499 0.263 0.025 0.090 0.018 0.137 
9 0.448 0.324 0.048 0.096 0.015 0.211 
10 0.565 0.446 0.060 0.193 0.013 0.133 
11 0.515 0.288 0.015 0117 0.014 0.221 
12 0.277 0.305 0.027 0.130 0.031 0.123 
(1) A low p-value enables one to reject the null hypothesis that the variable x does not Granger cause the 
variable y. 
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As expected, in the pre-crisis period, foreign currency-denominated 
loans are offered by the banking system as long as individuals open 
foreign currency bank accounts. This conclusion is in line with the 
results in Morón and Castro (2003) indicating that before the crisis, 
dollarization was mostly driven by the preference of the non-banking 




However, after the crisis, the causality changed: as banks borrowed from 
abroad, they also offered credits in foreign currency. As individuals 
borrowed in foreign currency, foreign currency-denominated bank 
accounts also increased. Therefore, dollarization in the economy has 
mostly been supply-driven in the form of offshore dollarization of the 
banking sector as well as liability dollarization of the non-banking 
sector. 
 
III.1.3.Testing for Stationarity and Co-integration  
 
Our empirical analysis proceeds by testing stationarity. The results of 
both Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) and Phillips-Perron (PP) unit root 
tests suggest that all the series are non-stationary and integrated of order 






                                                 
5
 This study does not cover an analysis of the determinants of dollarization. Rather, it 
tries to give an idea about where dollarization originates, i.e. either on the asset side or 
the liability side of the banks’ balance sheets. However, another study by Metin-Ozcan 
and Us (2005) and Metin-Özcan and Us (2006) provides a detailed analysis of the 
determinants of dollarization in Turkey. 
6
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If b is significant, the null hypothesis of non-stationarity is rejected. A significant ADF 
test statistic thus rejects the null, implying stationarity. The ADF test corrects for 
higher order serial correlation by assuming that the series follows an AR(p) process 
and adds p lagged differenced terms. The Phillips-Perron test is similar to the ADF test 
but uses a non-parametric correction for serial correlation; this is robust with regard to 
both heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. For more detail on these tests, see Diebold 
(2000). 
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Table 2. Unit Root Tests 









Level -0.325 -0.524 -0.008 -0.537 
First Difference -4.761* -4.930* -7.163* -7.166* 
LD_NBS 
Level 0.245 -0.903 0.612 -0.933 
First Difference -3.978* -4.151* -8.985* -6.463* 
Offshore 
Level -0.919 -1.388 -2.277 -2.989 
First Difference -7.774* -7.752* -13.632* -9.101* 
*Significant at 1 percent. The optimal lag order is selected according to Akaike Information 
criteria. Bandwidth is selected according to Newey-West using Bartlett kernel. 
The results of the unit root test thus imply that we should test for a 
cointegrating relationship among the series.
7
 Table 3 shows the 
Johansen cointegration test results; these suggest that there is a 
cointegrating vector between asset dollarization and liability 
dollarization in the pre-crisis period. There also seems to be a 
cointegrating vector linking asset dollarization, liability dollarization 
and offshore dollarization, not just in the post-crisis period but also for 
the whole sample period.  
After normalizing
8
 for liability dollarization in the pre-crisis period and 
the whole sample, the cointegration test results suggest a positive long-
run relationship between asset dollarization and liability dollarization 
(Tables 1-2 in the Appendix). In the post-crisis period, after normalizing 
for asset dollarization, the cointegration test results indicate that asset 
dollarization is positively related to liability dollarization and offshore 
dollarization. 
                                                 
7
 More specifically, the finding that many macro time series may contain a unit root 
has spurred the development of the theory of non-stationary time-series analysis. Engle 
and Granger (1987) pointed out that a linear combination of two or more non-
stationary series may be stationary. If such a stationary linear combination exists, the 
non-stationary time series are cointegrated. The stationary linear combination is called 
the cointegrating equation and may be interpreted as a long-run equilibrium 
relationship among the variables. 
8
 Both the Granger causality test results and adjustment coefficients suggest that for the 
first sub-period and the whole sample, liability dollarization should be normalized 
whereas for the second sub-period, asset dollarization should be normalized. 
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Table 3. Johansen Cointegration Test Results 
Sample: 1996-2006 
 Maximal Eigenvalue Statistic Trace Statistic 
Eigenvalues Statistic 5% critical 
value 
Statistic 5% critical 
value 
0.263 34.218 25.823 56.549 42.915 
0.123 14.663 19.387 22.331 25.872 
0.0.66 7.668 12.518 7.668 12.518 
Sample: 1996-2001 
 Maximal Eigenvalue Statistic Trace Statistic 
Eigenvalues Statistic 5% critical 
value 
Statistic 5% critical 
value 
0.223 14.601 11.225 15.614 12.321 
0.017 1.013 4.130 1.013 4.130 
Sample: 2002-2006 
 Maximal Eigenvalue Statistic Trace Statistic 
Eigenvalues Statistic 5% critical 
value 
Statistic 5% critical 
value 
0.378 25.635 17.797 34.944 24.276 
0.158 9.255 11.225 9.309 12.321 
0.001 0.054 4.130 0.054 4.130 
 
In the first sub-period, the long-run relationship between asset 
dollarization and liability dollarization means that a 1-unit change in 
asset dollarization is associated by a liability dollarization change of 
almost 1 unit in the same direction. In the second sub-period we see that 
for a 1-unit increase in liability dollarization, asset dollarization 
increases by almost 1.5 units; in response to a 1-unit increase in offshore 
dollarization, asset dollarization increases by more than 7 units. These 
results clearly indicate the higher sensitivity of asset dollarization in the 
second sub-period than in the first.  
 
III.2. Error-Correction Modeling 
 
We now proceed by specifying an error-correction model (ECM) in 
order to find the short-run impact effects, the feedback effects and the 
long-run responses between our dollarization variables. Error correction 
mechanisms have been widely used in economics (see Davidson et al, 
1978; Hendry and von Ungern Sternberg, 1981; Currie, 1981; Salmon, 
1982; Engle and Granger, 1987). The concept of cointegration, 
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introduced by Engle and Granger (1987), together with the 
corresponding error-correction models allows these two characteristics 
to be modeled simultaneously. In other words, if two or more time series 
each of which is I(1) are cointegrated, then there exists a stationary 
representation that is called the error-correction representation. The idea 
behind an error correction model is that a proportion of the 
disequilibrium from one period is corrected in the next period.  
 
An error correction model in the spirit of the above-mentioned studies 
suggests that regressing the change in liability dollarization on the 
lagged values of changes in asset and offshore dollarization also 
including an error correction term which is obtained from the Johansen 
procedure, a constant and a political dummy, D1 can constitute a short-
run specification for liability dollarization for the whole period. For the 
first sub-period, an error correction representation for liability 
dollarization can be established by regressing changes in liability 
dollarization on the lagged changes in asset dollarization, a constant, 
error correction term and a political dummy, D2. Finally, the error 
correction model for the second sub-period is the regression of the 
change in liability dollarization on lagged change in asset and offshore 
dollarization also including an error correction term, a constant and a 
political dummy, D3 (Tables 4-6 in the Appendix). 
 
The model results show that the lagged error term from the cointegration 
vector is only significant in the equation for liability dollarization in the 
first sub-period whereas in the equation for asset dollarization in the 
second sub-period, the lagged error correction term is not significant. 
These results suggest that in the event of a shock that leads to a 
deviation in any of the variables from their equilibrium value, liability 
dollarization will adjust to re-establish this equilibrium while asset 
dollarization will not be able to converge equilibrium. Furthermore, the 
presence of a significant error correction term in the liability 
dollarization equation only, implies that Granger causality could only be 
verified from asset dollarization to liability dollarization. 
 
These results suggest that if there were a shock leading to a deviation in 
any of the variables from their equilibrium value, liability dollarization 
would adjust to re-establish this equilibrium while asset dollarization 
would not be able to converge equilibrium. The error correction term 
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being significant only in the liability dollarization equation implies that 
Granger causality can only be verified from asset dollarization to 
liability dollarization.  
 
VI. Concluding Remarks  
 
This paper attempts to analyze dollarization by highlighting aspects of 
the subject that were previously ignored. Unlike earlier research, 
dollarization is analyzed not only from the demand side (asset 
dollarization) but also from the supply side (liability dollarization). It is 
analyzed not only domestically but also externally by introducing a new 
measure of dollarization - offshore dollarization - to capture the 
increased external funding opportunities for banks after the crisis. Thus 
we were able to study both the sources of dollarization and the 
interrelation between these dollarization measures, in the short-run and 
in the long-run for the Turkish economy.  
 
Our results suggest that before the 2001 financial crisis, dollarization 
was mainly demand-driven in the Turkish economy and showed a 
continuously upward trend. The increasing demand for foreign assets 
resulted in an increase in foreign currency-denominated debt, thus 
causing an increasing liability dollarization. However, this story 
changed drastically after the crisis; both asset and liability dollarization 
changed direction following the crisis, and causality also changed. More 
specifically, the post-crisis period witnessed supply-driven and 
decreasing rates of dollarization. However, this period also saw more 
external funding opportunities for the banking system (the increase in 
offshore dollarization), which eventually fed into higher asset 
dollarization than otherwise would have occurred. Thus, the empirical 
evidence suggests that if it were not for the increasing rate of offshore 
dollarization, asset dollarization could have been lower.  
 
What caused the dramatic increase in offshore dollarization in the 
aftermath of the crisis? The fundamentals of the Turkish economy 
improved significantly in the post-crisis period but there was also an 
increase in excess global liquidity, in the form of increased capital flows 
to emerging market economies, Turkey among them. The increase in 
global liquidity caused an increase in offshore dollarization. In the 
meantime, the monetary authorities conducted a tight monetary policy 
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under the Inflation Targeting framework; this resulted in more attractive 
external funding due to arbitrage opportunities arising from a relatively 
higher domestic rate of interest. At the same time, the relatively stable 
foreign exchange rate (despite free float) resulted in less currency risk 
exposure for the private sector, encouraging them to seek to external 
funds on an even larger scale. Thus, the post-crisis monetary policy in 
Turkey set the stage for lower asset dollarization through lower inflation 
and a more stable exchange rate; but it also motivated more external 
funding due to interest rate differentials and decreased currency risk. 
 
The results of the study raise a number of questions that merit further 
study and analysis. First, it would be useful to repeat the same exercise 
on banking level data. More specifically, our anecdotal evidence 
suggests that banking sector data may not show homogeneity and the 
aggregation of the data may result in significant loss of information. In 
other words, even if the banking sector may be currency-balanced as a 
whole, it would likely be imbalanced at a micro level which implies that 
at the time of a real exchange rate adjustment, individual mismatches, 
rather than netting out, tend to lead to capital flight and even bank runs.  
 
Second, a further study may also incorporate the government side since 
a sizeable amount of government debt is foreign currency denominated. 
Third, a future study should take into account of the effects of capital 
inflow. In other words, the post-crisis dollarization in Turkey should be 
analyzed in the light of mounting global liquidity. Even though, our 
offshore dollarization variable tries to capture this effect, a further study 
should attempt to develop other measures. Moreover, the effect of 
central bank intervention in the foreign exchange market is extremely 
likely to have affected the dollarization process. Thus, a future study 
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Table 1. Cointegrating Equation of Liability Dollarization 
Dependent Variable: LD_NBS   
Sample: 1996-2006  












Table 2. Cointegrating Equation of Liability Dollarization 
Dependent Variable: LD_NBS 
Sample: 1996- 2001   





0.00725 LL 731.0252 
Table 3. Cointegrating Equation of Asset Dollarization 
Dependent Variable: AD_NBS   
Sample: 2002-2006  
Variable Coefficient Standard Error 
 
 
LD_NBS 1.555985 0.14521 
LL 401.0941 
OFFSHORE 7.244624 1.23420 
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Table 4. Short-run Specification of Liability Dollarization 
Dependent Variable: DLD_NBS   
Sample: 1996-2006  
Variable Coefficient t-Statistic 
 
 
C -0.102546 -2.019291 R
2 
0.579357 
DAD_NBS(-7) -0.240240 -1.918938 LL 238.0523 
DOFFSHORE(-10) -0.151358 -2.270897 DW stat 1.619439 
Error correction term* -0.040983 -1.863828 F-stat 36.15450 
D1 -0.095093 -11.55481 Prob (F-stat) 0.000000 
   AIC -4.237315 
* Error correction term is the first lag of the residuals of the long-run specification. 
Table 5. Short-run Specification of Liability Dollarization 
Dependent Variable: DLD_NBS 
Sample: 1996-2001   
Variable Coefficient t-Statistic 
 
 
C -0.001038 -0.332393 R
2 
0.730922 
DAD_NBS(-3) -0.735689 -6.161693 LL 142.9780 
DAD_NBS(-7) -0.536642 -3.949262 DW stat 2.019598 
Error correction term* -0.050495 -1.929422 F-stat 36.67134 
D2 -0.091600 -9.846152 Prob (F-stat) 0.000000 
   AIC -4.677220 
* Error correction term is the first lag of the residuals of the long-run specification. 
Table 6. Short-run Specification of Asset Dollarization 
Dependent Variable: DAD_NBS   
Sample: 2002-2006  
Variable Coefficient t-Statistic 
 
 
C -0.004817 -0.789846 R
2 
0.491094 
DLD_NBS(-1) 0.281160 4.968177 LL 149.5869 
DOFFSHORE(-1) 0.224829 2.025633 DW stat 1.575020 





D3 -0.025091 -4.369676 Prob (F-stat) 0.000001 
   AIC -5.456108 
* Error correction term is the first lag of the residuals of the long-run specification. 
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